

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02900 01 OF 04 231359Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 2900

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO, DPC

SUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING MAY 22, 1975; AGENDA ITEM II, STATE-
MENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

SUMMARY. IN HIS STATEMENT TO DPC MINISTERS ON MAY 22,
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR PETER HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY
COMMITTEE) HIGHLIGHTED THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONCERN TO THE
NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

AFTER A ROUGH APPRAISAL OF THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR
BALANCE, HE FOLLOWED WITH A BROADER DESCRIPTION OF THE CON-
VENTIONAL BALANCE WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, IS "ADEQUATELY STRUCK".

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02900 01 OF 04 231359Z

HOWEVER, HE SEES NATO AT A DISADVANTAGE IN QUANTITY OF
FORCES; IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF RESERVES AND SHORTER
CONSCRIPT SERVICE; AND IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WHERE
AN ALLIANCE OF FIFTEEN FACES A "MONOLITHIC STRUCTURE WHERE

DECISION TAKING IS EASY". SIR PETER STRESSED THE NEED FOR TIMELY POLITICAL DECISIONS TO ENABLE NATO COMMANDERS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF WARNING TIME. HE WARNED AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF DEFENSE REVIEWS ON MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND AGAINST THE "POTENTIALLY SERIOUS DANGERS" OF NATO NATIONS SUBSCRIBING TO INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION SUCH AS THAT CONCERNING USE OF MODERN WEAPONS ADVANCED AT THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. TURNING TO SPECIFIC DEFENSE ISSUES, SIR PETER MENTIONED THE NATO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM WHERE TWO PROCUREMENT DECISIONS (AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM AND F-104 REPLACEMENT) WILL BE CENTRAL TO ENHANCING CAPABILITY AND REDUCING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT. HE CRITICIZED THE WASTING OF RESOURCES BY DUPLICATION OF EFFORT, AND CITED "MR. SCHLESINGER'S REPORT" (NUNN STANDARDIZATION) AND EUROGROUP PROPOSALS AS STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY BUDGET AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM WILL BE INADEQUATE TO MEET BASIC REQUIREMENTS, STATING THAT "THIS ALLIANCE CANNOT FUNCTION PROPERLY UNLESS IT IS PROVIDED WITH THE MEANS TO DO SO". ON SACEUR'S FLEXIBILITY STUDY, SIR PETER NOTED THAT BECAUSE OF LIMITED TIME THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAS NOT YET FORWARDED THIS REPORT WHICH CONTAINS FIFTY-EIGHT SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS, TWENTY OF WHICH ARE AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT, AND WHICH WILL NEED "PRIOR POLITICAL COMMITMENT BY THE NATIONS". SIR PETER REPORTED TO MINISTERS THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION ENDORSED THE FEASIBILITY OF INITIATING A STUDY ON THE NATO MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE. IN CLOSING HE POINTED TO SOME ENCOURAGING IMPROVEMENTS, SUCH AS IN ARMORED FORCES, ARTILLERY AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AND NEW SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT. HE CALLED FOR CLOSER COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN ALL DEFENSE AREAS TO GET BETTER VALUE FOR EXPENDITURES. MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY SYG LUNS' COMMENTS OF WARNING TIME AND DETERRENCE AND BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S VIEWS OF THE POSSIBLE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF A MILITARY IMBALANCE. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02900 01 OF 04 231359Z

1. IN RESPONDING TO SIR PETER'S REMARKS, SYG LUNS ADDRESSED THE WARNING TIME ISSUE AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR TIMELY POLITICAL DECISION IN ORDER FOR NATO TO TAKE PREPARATORY STEPS. HE REFERRED TO ADMIRAL COUSINS' COMMENT AT SHAPEX TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US SHOULD BE ABLE TO REINFORCE IN EUROPE BEFORE THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC IS WON. LUNS ALSO STATED THAT, IN A CRISIS, WE MUST UNDERLINE OUR DETERMINATION SO AS TO CONTINUE DETERRENCE.

2. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER COMPLIMENTED SIR PETER ON THE LUCIDITY AND PENETRATION OF HIS REMARKS AND COMMENDED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON ITS EXCELLENT WORK OF LATE SUCH AS ITS CONTRIBUTION TO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE; THE CREATION OF AAFCE;

AN AWARENESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPAIN AND NATO'S
DEFENSE CAPABILITY: AND THE PLANNED COMMAND STRUCTURE
REVIEW. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER NOTED THAT, IN A TIME WHEN
THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE MAKES DEFENSE SEEM LESS IMPORTANT,
WE NEVERTHELESS FIND OURSELVES IN A PERIOD OF TESTING, BOTH
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL. IN THIS SITUATION, THE VITAL DIMENSION
IS POLITICAL WILL AND, ALTHOUGH SOME NATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEWS
ARE "NO-HOLDS-BARRED" (I.E., OBJECTIVE), HE IS CONCERNED THAT
THEY MASK BUDGET-CUTTING FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. RECOGNIZING
THE EXISTING PRESSURES, BOTH POLITICAL AND DOMESTIC, SECRETARY
SCHLESINGER STRESSED THAT IF THE MILITARY BALANCE IS UPSET,
WHICH IT COULD BE BY EROSION OF NATO'S COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE,
THEN WE WILL HAVE COLD COMFORT THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
PREVAILED IF, IN THE LONG RUN, WE LOSE THE PRIVILEGE OF
LIVING UNDER A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. CONTINUED SACRIFICES ARE
NECESSARY, AS MINISTERS OF DEFENSE PREACH TO EACH OTHER, BUT
WE MUST SELL OUR PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS. FULL, HONEST DEFENSE
REVIEWS WOULD SUGGEST DEFENSE EXPENDITURES SHOULD BE RISING.
OUR INDICATIONS UNDERSCORE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS' DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES ARE RISING. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER WENT ON TO
NOTE THAT, IN THE US, THE END OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA WAR HAS
PROVIDED SOME OFFSET TOWARD EUROPE. HE CLOSED BY REFERRING
TO SUSLOV'S STATEMENT ON MAY DAY, IN WHICH DETENTE WAS DEFINED
AS WESTERN ACCOMMODATION TO SOVIET MILITARY POWER, AND
EMPHASIZED THAT NATO MUST MATCH SOVIET EFFORTS. THIS WILL
REQUIRE POLITICAL COHESION AND POLITICAL WILL BY ALL.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 02900 01 OF 04 231359Z

COMMITTEE:

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02900 02 OF 04 231426Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID
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USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
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CINCUSAREUR
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 2900

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF SPEAKING TO YOU AGAIN ON SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT OF THE MILITARY ISSUES WITH WHICH THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN PRE-OCCUPIED DURING RECENT MONTHS.

THESE CANNOT, OF COURSE, BE DISSOCIATED FROM POLITICAL DECISIONS BECAUSE IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT OUR FORCES SHOULD BE ABLE TO OPERATE AS ONE ENTITY UNDER THE DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE OF THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE. BUT I WOULD UNDERLINE THE FACT THAT THE MOST SERIOUS ISSUES FOR THE MILITARY ALLIANCE, AND THOSE MOST DIFFICULT OF RESOLUTION, HAVE THEIR ORIGINS IN UNILATERAL DECISIONS ON DEFENCE TAKEN BY MEMBERS OF IT FOR NATIONAL REASONS. BECAUSE WHETHER THEY RELATE TO THE COMMITMENT OF FORCES, OR TO THE MONEY AND THE MEN, EQUIPMENT AND
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02900 02 OF 04 231426Z

SUPPLIES WHICH IT PROVIDES FOR NATO'S ARMOURY, THEY HAVE A PROFOUND AND, NOT INFREQUENTLY, DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND THUS ON OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A CHOESIVE, RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE MILITARY MACHINE.

THIS LEADS TO THE FIRST AND THE MOST BASIC FACTOR IN THE DETERMINATION OF OUR OWN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, WHICH IS OF COURSE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN OUR OWN CAPABILITIES AND THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT.

IT MUST, I BELIEVE, BE LOOKED AT FROM TWO PERSPECTIVES. FIRST, THAT THE BALANCE MUST BE STRUCK IN ALL THREE LEGS OF THE NATO DEFENSIVE TRIAD, THAT IS TO SAY IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FIELD, THE THEATRE NUCLEAR FIELD AND THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD. AN IMBALANCE IN ANY OF THESE LEGS OF THE TRIAD WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS.

IT IS MY VIEW THAT, AFTER THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IS NOW WELL STRUCK AND, SUBJECT TO CONTINUING SUCCESS IN THESE DIRECT TALKS, WOULD SEEM TO OFFER THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE PARITY WHILE REDUCING EXPENDITURE ON SUCH WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THE THEATRE NUCLEAR BALANCE, WHICH IS BEING CAREFULLY RE-EXAMINED AS A RESULT OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT, IS, I JUDGE, FAVOURABLE TO US AT THE MOMENT. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT NOTHING WILL OCCUR TO CHANGE THIS VIEW.

BUT, IT IS THE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO WHICH

WE MUST LOOK MOST CAREFULLY TODAY, PARTLY BECAUSE AN IMBALANCE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF NATO WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD WHICH WORRIES THE RUSSIANS AS MUCH AS IT DOES ME; AND, SECONDLY, IT IS IN THIS LEG OF THE TRIAD THAT WE HAVE SEEN DISQUIETING TRENDS OF REDUCTIONS, IN THE LAST YEAR, AND EVEN SINCE I LAST SPOKE TO THIS MINISTERIAL SESSION. I THEREFORE WARMLY SUPPORT THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENCE TO ALERT US ALL TO THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING BOTH THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

THE OTHER PERSPECTIVE IS A POLITICO/MILITARY EQUATION WHICH HAS FOUR TERMS ON EACH SIDE, IF I MAY PUT IT THAT WAY. THESE TERMS ARE QUANTITY, QUALITY, MILITARY EFFICIENCY AND MORALE, AND POLITICAL WILL. CONFINING MY REMARKS FOR THE MOMENT TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, I BELIEVE THE BALANCE STILL TO BE ADEQUATELY STRUCK, BUT IT IS A FACT, NOT JUST MY OPINION, THAT IN TERMS OF QUANTITY THE WARSAW PACT FORCES HAVE INCREASED

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02900 02 OF 04 231426Z

OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS AND NATO'S COMBAT READY FORCES HAVE DECREASED.

ALTHOUGH IT IS NO MORE THAN A BROAD COMPARISON YOU WILL GET AN IDEA OF THE NUMERICAL BALANCE FROM THE FIRST ILLUSTRATION IN THE BOOKLETS YOU HAVE BEFORE YOU.

ON THE SIDE OF QUALITY I BELIEVE THAT IN MOST RESPECTS NATO STILL HAS THE EDGE, BUT NO INFORMED PERSON WOULD DENY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE MADE REMARKABLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO CLOSE THIS TECHNOLOGICAL GAP AND EQUALLY IN MANY RESPECTS AND IN ALL ELEMENTS THEIR WEAPONRY AND EQUIPMENT IS APPROACHING THE QUALITY OF OURS. INDEED IN MR. SCHLESINGER'S RECENT REPORT TO CONGRESS HE ASSERTS THAT IN SOME RESPECTS THEY HAVE NOT ONLY CAUGHT UP, BUT PASSED US.

TO ASSESS THE STATE OF TRAINING AND MORALE IS MORE DIFFICULT, AND MUST BE IN CONSIDERABLE MEASURE A MATTER OF OPINION OR JUDGEMENT. WHILE I HAVE COMPLETE AND, I BELIEVE, JUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE IN THE STATE OF TRAINING AND MORALE OF THE PEACE TIME FORCES DEPLOYED BY NATO, I CANNOT REGARD THE STATE OF TRAINING AND THE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO SOME OF OUR RESERVE FORCES WITH ANYTHING BUT SERIOUS CONCERN AND THIS IS AGGRAVATED BY A GROWING AND DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO REDUCE THE LENGTH OF CONSCRIPT SERVICE. I WOULD MENTION, PARENTHETICALLY, THAT IT IS THE OPINION OF SOME THAT YOU CANNOT TRAIN A SOLDIER FOR FORMATION FIGHTING IN UNDER 18 MONTHS, AND ALREADY SOME COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE REDUCED THEIR CONSCRIPT PERIODS WELL BELOW THIS.

FINALLY, THERE IS THE MATTER OF POLITICAL WILL, AND I CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS PART OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, AS WELL AS A MATTER OR PRIMARY CONCERN IN ITS OWN RIGHT. CONFRONTED WITH A MONOLITHIC STRUCTURE WHERE DECISION TAKING IS EASY, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE PROBLEMS OF AN ALLIANCE OF 15 NATIONS MUST IN THE NATURE OF THINGS BE MORE DIFFICULT.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02900 03 OF 04 231436Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

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USMISSION GENEVA

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 2900

OBVIOUSLY OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES CANNOT GUARANTEE WHAT FOREWARNING THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE US FROM POLITICAL INDICATORS AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF WHEN AN ATTACK WOULD OCCUR. NEVERTHELESS, THEY HAVE DEVISED A WARNING PROCEDURE WHICH IS OUTLINED IN THE SECOND OF THE ILLUSTRATIONS IN THE BOOKLET.

I DO NOT WISH TO DWELL ON THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, BUT WHAT I DO WISH TO STRESS IS THAT WARNING TIME, IN ITSELF, IS OF NO USE WHATSOEVER TO OUR COMMANDERS UNLESS IT IS EMPLOYED TO TAKE DECISIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO MAKE AND COMPLETE THEIR VITAL MILITARY PREPARATIONS. OUR PROCEDURAL EXERCISES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THIS MATTER, AND HOW INDECISION, WHICH PRECLUDES PREPARATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD, MERELY HAS THE EFFECT OF LOWERING THE NUCLEAR SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02900 03 OF 04 231436Z

THRESHOLD TO THE POINT WHERE ESCALATION WILL BE INEVITABLE IN THE VERY EARLY STAGES OF THE CONFLICT. UNLIKE THE SOVIETS WE HAVE NO BUFFER ZONE, AND THEREFORE NATO CANNOT TRADE TERRITORY FOR TIME.

I NOW WISH TO TURN TO THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL AND BALANCED

FORCE REDUCTIONS AND TO THE FACT THAT SINCE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA STARTED, ABOUT 18 MONTHS AGO, FOUR COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE EMBARKED ON MAJOR REVIEWS OF THEIR DEFENCE FORCES. THREE OF THESE WERE DIRECTED TOWARDS SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN ALLIED CAPABILITY AND ALL OF THEM, TO SOME EXTENT, WILL INFLUENCE OUR POSTURE AND CAPABILITIES IN ALL THREE REGIONS. ANY THINNING OUT OF COMBAT READY FORCES, EVEN - OR PERHAPS PARTICULARLY - OVER LOGISTICS, IS BOUND TO DIMINISH OUR SIDE OF THE QUANTITY TERM IN THE BALANCE EQUATION. WE CANNOT SAY TO WHAT EXTENT THE SELF-MADE ALLIANCE REDUCTIONS MIGHT AFFECT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE FAVOURABLY.

ON A RELATED, ALTHOUGH NOT YET A MILITARY MATTER, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AT THEIR MEETING THIS MONTH, EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW DEALING WITH A PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF MODERN WEAPONS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS ISSUED A PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT, AND I UNDERTOOK TO BRING TO YOUR NOTICE THE VIEW OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS DANGERS, OF NATO NATIONS SUBSCRIBING TO THIS TYPE OF INT'L LEGISLATION, WHICH, IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, SO CLEARLY CONFLICTS WITH OUR DEFENSIVE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS.

I WILL NOW TURN TO SOME OF THE PRACTICAL ISSUES ON WHICH WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT, AND WHICH WERE CONSIDERED BY YOUR CHIEFS OF STAFF WHEN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE MET HERE THIS MONTH.

FIRST THE REPLACEMENT OF MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE NATO AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM OVER THE NEXT DECADE WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF NATO IS TO HAVE A COUNTER TO THE THREATS AT HIGH, MEDIUM AND LOW LEVELS FROM THE INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED POTENTIAL OF THE WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES. THE RIGHT "MIX" OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, RADARS AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IS VITAL TO AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION. IN THIS FIELD THERE ARE TWO MAJOR ISSUES WHICH CONCERN US AT THE PRESENT TIME.

THE PROPOSAL FOR A NEW AND EXTENSIVE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM. YOU WILL BE DISCUSSING THIS LATER IN THE AGENDA AND I HOPE I MAY CATCH THE CHAIRMAN'S EYE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02900 03 OF 04 231436Z

WHEN THAT ITEM IS DEBATED. SECOND THE IMPORTANCE OF A DECISION, AND SPECIALLY ONE THAT LEADS TO A COMMON REPLACEMENT FOR THE F-104, NEEDS NO EMPHASIS FROM ME.

WHILE THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES RECOGNISE THAT THERE ARE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS CLEARLY ILLOGICAL TO CONTINUE TO PROLIFERATE OUR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT, APART FROM THE ENORMOUS WASTE OF RESOURCES ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT, WHICH HAS BECOME A FEATURE OF INDIVIDUAL PROCUREMENT PROGRAMMES. STATISTICS INDICATE THAT THE USA SPENDS 4.6 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR ON MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND EUROPE 2.6 BILLION, AND YET WE CONTINUE TO COMPETE FOR A MARKET THAT DIMINISHES FOR THE VERY REASON THAT SO MUCH DEFENCE MONEY, INTENDED FOR A COMMON PURPOSE, IS WASTED BY THIS RANGING DUPLICATION OF EFFORT. IF I MAY MENTION MR. SCHLESINGER'S

REPORT AGAIN, HE HAS GIVEN SOME VERY WISE COUNSEL ON THIS
WHOLE SUBJECT, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE EUROGROUP HAS ALREADY
AGREED TO MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSALS.

I WOULD MERELY LIKE TO REPORT THAT HERE IN EVERE WE
HAE SUNK OUR TEETH DEEP INTO THIS ENDLESSLY DEBATED MATTER, AND
THIS TIME WE ARE NOT GOING TO LET GO.

GENTLEMEN, I HAVE SO FAR CONCENTRATED ON STRATEGIC
MATTERS AND ON NATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO NATIONAL FORCES. I NOW
WISH FINALLY TO TURN TO THE INTERNATIONALLY FUNDED AND SUPORTED
ELEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE.

FIRST, THE INT'L MILITARY BUDGET, WHICH IN REAL TERMS
DECREASED FROM BF 4.4BILLION A YEAR IN 1971 TO BF 3.8
BILLION IN 1974. THE THIRD ILLUSTRATION IN THE FOLDERS BEFORE
YOU SHOWS THE DOWNWARD PROGRESSION. NEARLY HALF OF THIS MONEY
IS SPENT ON PAY FOR THE SUPPORTING CIVILIAN ELEMENT OF THE
NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE AND THE REMAINDER FOR MILITARY EXERCISES
AND THE DAY TO DAY RUNNING OF THE ORGANISATION.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02900 04 OF 04 231524Z

44

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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDELMBFR VIENNA

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USLOSACLANT

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CINCUSAREUR

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 2900

UNLESS THE REAL VALUE OF THIS BUDGET CAN BE SUSTAINED
TO ENABLE US TO KEEP UP AT LEAST THE SAME LEVEL OF ACTIVITY AS
IN 1974 AND 1975 THEN CLEARLY THERE WILL HVE TO BE CUTS IN OUR
CIVILIAN ESTABLISHMENTSN AND IN THE EXERCISES SO NECESSARY

TO PROFICIENCY AND READINESS, WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN CUT TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ACCOUNT FOR ONLY 7 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET.

VERY SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME, WHERE THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS REPRESENTED A REQUIREMENT FOR IAU 926 MILLION FOR THE PERIOD 1975-1979. THIS WAS ENDORSED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE BUT ONLY IAU 400 MILLION WAS ALLOCATED BY THIS COMMITTEE, AND THERE STILL REMAIN RESERVATIONS IN THIS FIGURE. AS 100 MILLION OF THIS IS ALREADY PRE-COMMITTED FOR PROJECTS AND MAINTENANCE, COMMANDERS ARE LEFT WITH ONE THIRD OF THE RESOURCES THEY GENUINELY REQUIRE TO CARRY
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02900 04 OF 04 231524Z

FORWARD PROJECTS THAT IN MANY CASES HAVE ALREADY HAD YOUR OWN APPROVAL.

I RECOGNISE THAT IN ALL THESE AREAS NATIONAL AND NATO COMMITMENTS COME UNDER A COMMON HEADING OF DEFENCE BOTH FOR BUDGETARY PURPOSES AND IN THE COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES. BUT QUITE CLEARLY THIS ALLIANCE CANNOT FUNCTION PROPERLY UNLESS IT IS PROVIDED WITH THE MEANS TO DO SO. MUCH IN THE MILITARY AREAS CAN, AND IS, BEING DONE ON A LOW COST, NO COST BASIS, BUT A GREAT DEAL MORE DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON THE CONTINUED AND ADEQUATE PROVISION OF MONEY, MEN AND RESOURCES. AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SAID RECENTLY - WE GET NOTHING FROM WHAT WE ALLOCATE TO DEFENCE - EXCEPT SECURITY. IF THAT IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALL OF US THEN I SUGGEST THAT NATIONS MUST SUSTAIN THEIR EFFORTS IN ALL THESE FIELDS.

IN FURTHERANCE OF THE DIRECTIVE FROM THIS COMMITTEE SACEUR HAS JUST COMPLETED THE SECOND STAGE OF HIS STUDY ON FLEXIBILITY. AS IT DID NOT REACH US UNTIL 9TH MAY, IT HAS NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO YOU, BUT IS WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND FORWARDED WITH THEIR VIEWS TO YOUR PERMANENT REPS.

THE REPORT CONTAINS 58 SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH MERIT SUPPORT, AND 20 OF THESE WHICH ARE AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT, SEEK PRIOR POLITICAL COMMITMENT BY THE NATIONS. IN PARTICULAR THE DEFINITION OF WHAT SUPPORT NATIONS CAN AND WILL PROVIDE IN CRISIS OR WAR, AND A STRONG RECOMMENDATION FOR AN INCREASE IN STOCK LEVELS. SACEUR HAS ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING FULL USE OF WARNING TIME, AND TO DO THIS HE RECOMMENDS SIMPLIFYING ALERT MEASURES, AND PLANNING TO MOBILISE IN A TIMELY, ORDERLY WAY, SO THAT NATO COMMANDERS CAN TAKE CONTROL OF THEIR FORCES ON A PREDICTABLE BASIS. BECAUSE MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES ARE THE BEST TEST AND THE BEST MEANS OF INCREASING OUR FLEXIBILITY, HE HAS ASKED FOR FULL SUPPORT IN DEVELOPING HIS EXERCISE PROGRAMME. THESE OF COURSE ARE MERELY EXAMPLES OF SOME OF THE MAIN POINTS OF A THOROUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE REPORT.

AT THEIR MEETING HERE LAST WEEK, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION ENDORSED THE FEASIBILITY OF EMBARKING ON A STUDY OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ITS ASSOCIATED AGENCIES. IT IS THEIR INTENTION THAT THE COMMAND STRUCTURE SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE REFERRED TO THE DPC AS SOON AS TERMS OF REFERENCE AND PRO-

POSALS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE STUDY HAVE BEEN DRAWN UP AND END-
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02900 04 OF 04 231524Z

ORSED BY THE COMMITTEE.

GENTLEMEN: I RECOGNISE, WITH LITTLE SATISFACTION THAT MUCH
OF WHAT I HAVE HAD TO SAY IS A CHRONICLE OF SHORTCOMINGS, BUT I
SHOULD BE LESS THAN HONEST WERE I TO ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THEM,
OR AOUR APPREHENSION ABOUT THE FUTURE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

NEVERTHELESS IT IS ENCOURAGEING TO ALL OF US IN THE
MILITARY ARENA THAT IN SO MANY RESPECTS DEFENCE RESOURCES HAVE
BEEN MAINATINED BY NATIONS AND IN SOME CASES INCREASED. OUR
ARMOURED FORCES, ARTILLERY AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS HAVE BEEN
IMPROVED IN QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE, AND NEW SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
WHICH WILL ENHANCE OUR ORDER OF BATTLE ARE CONTINUING TO COME
FORWARD. I HOPE THAT WHAT I HAVE SAID SO FAR MAY THEREFORE BE
REGARDED AS A SOMEWHAT ABBREVIATED HIGH-LIGHTING OF THE PRINCIPAL
AREAS OF MILITARY CONCERN.

THE REMEDY - TO MISQUOTE M. BRIAND, - "IS FAR TOO
SERIOUS A THING TO BE LEFT TO MILITARY MEN". BUT IF A MILITARY
MAN MAY VENTURE AN LOPINION IT IS THAT IT LIES, NOT NECESSARILY
IN SPENDING MORE ON DEFNCE, BUT IN CLOSER COOPERATION AND COOR-
DINATION OF ALL OUR ENDEAVOURS - RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PRO-
DUCTION, PROCUREMENT, TRAINING, PROCEDURES, AND IN THE MANAGE-
MENT OF OUR AFFAIRS, SO THAT WE GET BETTER VALUE FOR WHAT WE DO
SPEND.

DESPITE MY HAVING TO LAY A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS
TODAY ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMETN, I
WOULD NOT WISH YOU TO ASSUME THAT THERE ARE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE
CALIBRE OF THE YOUNG MEN IN OUR FIGHTING SERVICES, NOR THAT THE
MILITARY FOR WHOM I SPEAK TODAY ARE DOWNCAST. WE MOST CERT-
AINLY ARE NOT, BUT WE REALLY DO NEED HELP FROM YOU. IN 1812,
A MILITARY OVSERVER IN MOSCOW SAID OF THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER -
"HE IS ATHLETIC, SHORT AND STRONG, INURED TO HARDSHIP, FERO-
CIOUS AND UNCIVILISED, BRAVE AND DISCIPLINED, PATIENT AND SUB-
ORDINATE". I DOUBT WHETHER MUCH HAS CHANGED, BUT WHERE OUR OWN
SOLDIERS AE CONCERNED I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THEY CAN ADD TO RUSSIAN
VIRTURES THE ATTRIBUTES OF HUMANITY, REASONING AND PERCEP-
TION, AND A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MAKES LIFE WORTHWHILE.
ALL DANGEROUS SYMPTOMS FOR THE SOVIETS, BUT TO US AN IMMEAS-
URABLE ASSET AND A SOURCE OF STRENGTH.

THAT IS ALL I HAVE TO SAY, MR. CHAIRMAN EXCEPT TO
THANK YOU AND THE DPC FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOU TODAY.
END TEXT
BRUCE
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 02900 04 OF 04 231524Z

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO02900
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
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Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750599/abbrzkeo.tel
Line Count: 538
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
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Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
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Review Date: 01 APR 2003
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Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING MAY 22, 1975; AGENDA ITEM II, STATE- MENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
TAGS: MPOL, NATO, DPC
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
GENEVA
MADRID
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
CINCUSAEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAFE

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006